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PROLOGUE
Dick Park played a c r i t i c a l  r o l e  in my dec i s i on  to go to South Asia and 
to pursue my i n t e r e s t  in c ompara t i v e  m i l i t a r y  s o c i o l o g y  s t r a t e gy  and 
f o r e i gn  p o l i c y  He persuaded me in 1961 t h a t  such work would be o f  
i n t e r e s t  to the s c h o l a r l y  communi ty and t h a t  i t  was f e a s i b l e  to car ry  
out my r esearch in I nd i a  1 was p a r t i c u l a r l y  g r a t i f i e d  t h e r e f o r e  
when he asked me to c o l l a b o r a t e  on what t urned  out  to  be h i s  l a s t  
book Indi a  Emergent P o w e r 9 and s t i l l  impressed at hi s  a n a l y t i c a l  
powers This paper bui l ds  on some i deas  we di scussed in the wr i t i ng  o f  
that  book but were not abl e  to i n c o r p o r a t e  I w i l l  above a l l  miss 
hi s  c r i t i c i s m  and support
1I____ STATE_ A ND REGION
R e g i o na l i s t  t h e o r y  has u s u a l l y  emphas i zed the  g rowth o f  trade 
commerce cu l t ur a l  r e l a t i o n s  l i n g u i s t i c  commonal i ty and even mai l  
f l ow to i d e n t i f y  a growing " r e g i o n "  Such r eg i ons  werp in the 1950s
and 1960s t h o u g h t  t o  be t he  n a t u r a l  s u c c e s s o r  to i n d i v i d u a l  
n a t i o n a l i s m s  A g a i n s t  t h i s  s t a n d a r d  Sout h As i a  was an arpa o f  
d e c l i n i ng  r e g i o n a l i t y  through the 1950s and e s p e c i a l l y  a f t e r  1965 when 
c i v i l i a n  t i e s  b e t w e e n  I n d i a  and P a k i s t a n  wer e  s h a r p l y  l i m i t e d  
Indeed some informed Indian w r i t i n g  made the argument uhat these t i e s  
o n l y  s e r v ed  t o  e x a c e r b a t e  I n d o -  P a k i s t a n c o n f l i c t - and welcomed 
Pak i s t an ’ s at t empts to become in s p i r i t  ( i f  not  geography)  a West 
Asian or I s l a m i c  s t a t e  *
I have always regarded the r e g ion a l i s t íe school  as e x c e s s i v e l y  
e thnocent r i c  f o r  the onl y  r eg i on ever r e a l l y  studi ed c a r e f u l l y  was 
Europe and the Western h a l f  at that  I t  s t r i k e s  me as s e l f - e v i d e n t  
that  India in i t s e l f  r epr esent s  a " r e g i o n "  in terms o f  i t s  s i z e  and 
d i v e r s i t y — toge ther  a match f or  Europe Lat in America or A f r i c a — and 
that  the accompl ishment o f  t h i r t y - f i v e  years in keeping th i s  " r e g i on "  
i n t ac t  has been a minor mi rac l e  o f  our t ime This can al so be said o f  
even a truncated Pakistan s t i l l  a d i v e r s e  sprawl i ng  '•nd substant i a l  
p o l i t i c a l  e n t i t y
But what o f  Souuh A s i a "  ( o r  the I nd i an Subcont i nent  " as some 
would have i t ) 9 Can we speak o f  r e g i o n a l i s m  in the c l a s s i c a l  sense9 
Obviousl y not the two b i g g e s t  South Asian s t a t e s  have beenlocked in 
c o n f l i c t  s i nce  19^7 and are  now on the  v e r g e  o f  n u c l e a n z i n g  t he i r  
arms race Even in i t s  r e l a t i o n s  wi th i t s  smal l er  ne i ghbors India can
h a r d l y  be sa i d  to e n j o y  a c o r d i a l  r e l a t i o n s h i p  as d i s p u t e s  over
2i m m i g r a t i o n  w a t e r  f o o d  t r a d e  t r a n s i t  and Bombay f i l m s  are 
cont inuing  sources o f  i r r i t a t i o n
This i s  a far  cry  from the South As i a  envi saged by Nehru Gandhi 
2
or even Jmnah Wh i l e  d i v i d e d  the f u t u r e  shape o f  the Subcont inent  
they  were a g r e e d  t h a t  t h e  r e g i o n ' s  m i l i t a r y  f o r c e s  should f ace  
outward not  inward I ns t e a d  r e l a t i o n s  be tween India and Pakistan
(and at t imes I nd i a  and i mpo v e r i s he d  Bang l adesh )  ha\/e become hi ghl y  
m i l i t a r i z e d  w i t h  at  l e a s t  a m i l l i o n  armed men two thousand tanks 
and abou t  a t h o u s a n d  s o p h i s t i c a t e d  a i r c r a f t  ( s ome  now proud l y  
manufactured m the r e g i on )  poised for  ac t i on
Thi s  e s sa y  a t t e mp t s  to a s s e s s  t h i s  new r e g i o n a l i s m '  one in 
which the major  r e g i o n a l  s t a t e s  ar e  l o cked  t o g e t h e r  in an ambiguous 
embrace o f  l ove  and hate e x p e c t a t i o n  and dread Indeed i t  seems that  
many r e g i o n a l  s t a t e s  a r e  t i e d  t o g e t h e r  more f i r m l y  by t h e i r  mutual 
f e a r  s u s p i c i o n  and d i s t r u s t  t h a t  t h e y  a r e  by mutual  t r a d e  or  
commerce- -hate  and f e a r  can be as s t r o n g  a bond as g r eed  We w i l l  
focus on the s t ruc ture  and e t i o l o g y  o f  r e g i o n a l  c o n f l i c t  see ing i t  as 
a perverse  form o f  r eg i ona l i sm our argument w i l l  be that  whxle some 
degree o f  c o n f l i c t  i s  i n h e r e n t  in s t r u c t u r a l  and phys i ca l  d i s p a r i t i e s  
between the South Asian s t a t e s  r e c e n t  s t r a t e g i c  developments present  
new o ppo r t un i t i e s  as we l l  as new p e r i l s  in the move from the present  
system o f  r eg i ona l  h o s t i l i t y  to another arrangement o f  the pi eces  
I I  THE STRUCTURE OF SOUTH ASIAN CONFLICT TYPOLOGIES 
Armed c o n f l i c t  in South A s i a  has t h r e e  s t r i k i n g  a t t r i b u t e s  
F i r s t  i t  has occurred f r e q u e n t l y  and wi th i nc r eas i ng  i n t e n s i t y  From 
the time the Br i t i sh  wi thdrew f rom the Subcont inent  in 19*17 there have 
been f our  maj or  and s e v e r a l  m i no r  i n t e r - s t a t e  wars  ^ S e v e r a l  o f
3these have had momentous p o l i t i c a l  and human consequences  The 1971 
I n d o - P d k i s t a n  war l e d  to t h e  o n l y  s u c c e s s f u l  p a r t i t i o n i n g  o f  a 
p o s t - c o l o n i a l  s t a t e  t he  same war saw t he  d e a t h s  o f  hundreds o f  
tnousands  ( some  c l a i m  m i l l i o n s )  o f  c i v i l i a n s  as  d i d  the  r i o t s  
preceding and accompanying  P a r t i t i o n  Second t he s e  wars have been 
qui t e  Qi verse  m nature Some have i n v o l v e d  i n f an t r y  armor and a i r  
b a t t l e s  which were model l ed on the c l a s s i c  World War I I  pat t ern others  
have had el ements o f  " n a t i o n a l  l i b e r a t i o n  war and s t i l l  others  have 
been i n t e rna l  wars in which p e r i p h e r a l  a r eas  have  sought autonomy or 
independence Third the c o n f l i c t s  o f  South Asia ca r r y  an i ncreas ing  
po t e n t i a l  f or  d e s t r u c t i v e n e s s  De s p i t e  the occas i ona l  e x t ens i ve  l oss 
o f  c i v i l i a n  c a s u a l t i e s  t h e r e  has been some sense  o f  a " g e n t l e men ' s  
agreement '  between at l e a s t  I nd i a  and Pa k i s t a n  even the Chinese were 
r es t r a i ned  m  not  bombing p o p u l a t i o n  c e n t e r s  d u r i ng  the 1 962 war 
t h i s  may not hold t rue  m  the f u t u r e  as both the  p o l i t i c a l  stakes 
may have increased f or  a l l  p a r t i e s  concerned and the r eg i on i s  on the 
br ink o f  a quantum jump o f  sheer  d e s t r u c t i v e  power Afghani stan which 
must be i n c l ud e d  in any c o mp r e h e n s i v e  d e f i n i t i o n  o f  South As i a  
would be a grim precursor  o f  t h i n g s  to come wi th i t s  shat t ered soc i a l  
i n f r a s t r uc t u r e  a Sov i e t  army o f  o c cupa t i o n  and a quar t er  o f  i t s  popu 
l a t i o n  dr i ven beyond i t s  b o r d e r s  or  dead The c o n f l i c t s  o f  South Asia 
f a l l  i n t o  f i v e  c a t e g o r i e s  The f i r s t  are the  wars f ought  between
I nd i a  and Pak i s t an  proper  In a s e n s e  t hese  would not  have been
fought  had P a r t i t i o n  not  c r e a t e d  two s e p a r a t e  s t a t e s  in 1947 These 
wars— 1947 1965 1 9 7 1 — have i n v o l v e d  enormous numbers o f  t roops and
b i l l i o n s  o f  d o l l a r s  o f  m i l i t a r y  equi pment  v i r t u a l l y  a l l  o f  i t  once 
o b t a i n e d  f rom abroad but  now i n c r e a s i n g l y  f a b r i c a t e d  in the two
States Indo-Paki stan c o n f l i c t  has a s p e c i a l  q ua l i t y  about i t  more
than one general  on e i t h e r  s i de  has c h a r a c t e r i z e d  these s t rugg l es  as a 
"communal  n o t  wi th  armor " The v e r y  i d e n t i t y  o f  Pak i s t an  (an 
avowedly I s l amic  s t a t e )  and I n d i a  (a s ecul ar  s t a t e  wi th a l ar ge  Hindu 
m a j o r i t y )  stand as a c h a l l e n g e  to the o t h e r  even communal r i o t s  
w i t h i n  t he s e  s t a t e s  have  c o n t r i b u t e d  to war be tween the two The 
c o n t i n u i n g  s t r u g g l e  o v e r  Kash m i r - -  w i th i t s  p r e d o m i n a t e l y  Musl im 
populat i on under Indian c o n t r o l  — i s  w i d e l y  desc r i bed  as e i t he r  one o f  
t h e  main c a u s e s  o f  c o n f l i c t  b e t w e e n  t he  two s t a t e s  o r  as a 
consequence  o f  t h e i r  mutual  d i s t r u s t  i t  may be both at  the same 
t i m e
Kashmir i s  al so the l a s t  example o f  an obso l e t e  kind o f  war wars 
o f  na t i ona l  c o n s o l i d a t i o n  When I nd i a  was p a r t i t i o n e d  there were a 
number  o f  s e mi - a u t o n o mous p r i n c e l y  s t a t e s  r e m a i n i n g  in t he  
Subcont inent  when some o f  them h e s i t a t e d  to j o i n  India or Pakistan 
f orce  was q u i c k l y  a p p l i e d  to b r i n g  them under c o n t r o l  No pr i nce l y  
s t a t e  has been a l l o we d  to ma i nt a i n  even token armed f o r c e s  and the 
i d e n t i t i e s  o f  such s t a t e s  have  been o b l i t e r a t e d  compl et e l y  in India  ^
Pakistan r e t a i ns  some o f  them f o r  a d m i n i s t r a t i v e  purposes but they are 
l a r g e l y  run by the c e n t r a l  gove rnment  in I s l amabad Whi l e  they are 
p r i mar i l y  o f  h i s t o r i c a l  i n t e r e s t  today i t  must be remembered that  some 
o f  t hese  p r i n c e l y  s t a t e s  were v as t  and w e l l  e s t a b l i s h e d  i d e n t i t i e s  
( H y d e r a b a d  in c e n t r a l  I n d i a  had s i x t e e n  m i l l i o n  p e o p l e  and a 
subs tant i a l  army) and t h e i r  a b s o r p t i o n  was a maj or  cha l l enge  to the 
new s t a t e s  o f  I nd i a  and P a k i s t a n  I n d i a ' s  m i l i t a r y  conques t  o f  
Portuguese t e r r i t o r i e s  in 1961 f a l l s  i n t o  t h i s  ca t egor y  al tnough Goa
was not a p r i nc e l y  s t a t e
5A th i rd  v a r i e t y  o f  c o n f l i c t  in South Asia i nvo l v e s  the s t rugg l e  o f  
the per i phery  against  the center  In both India and Pakistan there are 
maj or  t r i b a l  p opu 1 a11 o n s - - i n I n d i a ' s  N o r t h e a s t  Nagas Mi zos  and 
others  and in Pak i s t an ' s  Nor t hwes t  F r o n t i e r  Prov ince  and Baluchistan 
Pathans and Ba l u c h i s  who are  pa r t  o f  the w o r l d ' s  l a r g e s t  remaining 
t r i b a l  s o c i e t y  In I nd i a  t h e r e  i s  a l s o  a second ' pe r i phery '  l ocat ed  
in the i s o l a t e d  t r i b a l  b e l t s  a r e a s  o f  s e v e r a l  major s t a t es  ( e s p e c i a l l y  
West Bengal  Bihar  and Andhra)  Many o f  t h e s e  ar eas  were a l l owed  
cons i de rab l e  autonomy by the  B r i t i s h  and some t r i b a l  groups expected 
that  i ndependence would c o n t i nue  t h i s  pat t ern ^
Even t oday  t h e r e  are  l ^ r g e  a r e a s  o f  I n d i a  and Pak i s t an  where 
normal admi n i s t r a t i v e  procedures do not apply and t r i b a l  customs e x i s t  
wi thout  s e r i o us  i n t e r f e r e n c e  f r on  c e n t r a l  g o ve rnment  o f f i c i a l s  In 
some r e g i o n s  in both s t a t e s  s p e c i a l  pa r a - m1 1 1 1 a r y u n i t s  have  been 
r a i sed  from l o c a l  popul at i ons  ( but  commanded by o f f i c e r s  on deputat i on 
from the army) to p r o v i d e  a token g o v e r n me n t a l  presence  and to watch 
the f r o n t i e r s  These are backed up by r egul ar  army uni ts where t r i b a l  
power s p i l l s  over  into a campai gn f o r  i ndependence  then ne i ther  state  
has hes i t a t ed  to use mas s i v e  ground and a i r  power to asse r t  nat i onal  
s o v e r e i g n t y  Thi s  t ask  i s  c o m p l i c a t e d  because  many t r i b a l  groups 
( e s p e c i a l l y  m  P a k i s t a n )  have  c l o s e  t i e s  a c r o s s  the i n t e r n a t i o n a l  
f r o n t i e r  and move f r e e l y  back and f o r t h  us i ng  f o r e i g n  t e r r i t o r y  as a 
sa f e -haven in I nd i a  some g roups  r e s e n t  the  enc roachment  o f  p l a ins  
Indians and f ear  the d e s t r uc t i o n  o f  t h e i r  t r i b a l  cul ture  and m a few 
r e g i o n s  t r i b a l  and poor  p e a s a n t  g r o u p s  have been m o b i l i z e d  a l ong  
c l a s s i c  Maoist r e v o l u t i o n a r y  l i n e s  In d e a l i n g  wi th these c o n f l i c t s  
both I nd i a  and Pak i s t an  have c a r e f u l l y  s t u d i e d  c o u n t e r - i n s u r g e n c y
6doc t r i ne  and in s eve ra l  cases have made the i r  own contr l but i on to th i s  
branch o f  the sc i ence  o f  war
A f our th v a r i e t y  o f  c o n f l i c t  in South As a l ias p i t t ed  r eg i onal  
s t a t es  aga ins t  n o n - r e g i o n a l  powers The 1962 S i no - I nd i an  war in the 
Himalayas and the 1 97 9 i nvas i on o f  A f ghani s t an by the Sov i e t  Union are 
best  seen as the l a t e s t  examples o f  a l ong  search for  i n f l uence  i f  not 
dominance in the l i m i t r o ph i c  shat t e r - zone  The names o f  the pl ayers  
have changed but el ements o f  the " g r e a t  game remain i t  s t i l l  does 
matter  to China the Sov i e t  Union India and Pakistan who c on t r o l s  the 
marchland across t h e i r  b o r d e r s  S t a l e s  such as Nepal  and Afghanistan 
have survi ved by ma i n t a i n i ng  a t enuous ba l a n c e  between t he i r  powerful  
nei ghbors r ecent  events  in the l a t t e r  i nd i c a t e  how tenuous i t  i s  and 
how g rea t  i s  the p r i c e  o f  m i s c a l c u l a t i o n  For India and Pakistan the 
s i t ua t i on  i s  f ur t he r  c o mp l i c a t e d  by the somet imes confus ing  r o l e  that  
the U S has p l a y ed  f o r  a t  l e a s t  t w e n t y  y e a r s  Wh i l e  mo t i v a t e d  
pr i mar i l y  by c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  o f  ant i - communism Amer i can support has 
n e c e s s a r i l y  a f f e c t e d  the  r e l a t i o n s h i p  b e t w e e n  t hes e  two s t a t e s  
sometimes d e f e a t i ng  the o r i g i n a l  purpose  o f  a s s i s t ance  One symbol i c 
but i mp o r t a n t  exampl e  w i l l  s u f f i c e  in 1962 the n u c l e a r  a i r c r a f t
c a r r i e r  1¿_S_S En t e r p r i s e  was d i s p a t c h e d  to the Bay o f  Bengal  to
demonstrate support  f or  the Indians in t he i r  s t rugg l e  aga i ns t  Communist 
China e x a c t l y  nine y e a r s  l a t e r  the En t e r p r i s e  again sa i l ed  into the 
Bay t h i s  t ime m  an i mp l i e d  t h r e a t  to I nd i a  and to demons t ra t e  to 
China that  i t  was w i l l i n g  to support  t he i r  mutual a l l y  Pakistan
F i n a l l y  we must a l s o  note  the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  a f i f t h  t ype  o f  
c o n f l i c t  in South Asia nuclear  war I t  i s  c once i vab l e  that  wi thin the 
next  f ew y e a r s  b o t h  I n d i a  and P a k i s t a n  w i l l  have  a c q u i r e d  the
7c a p a b i l i t y  o f  d e l i v e r i n g  at  l e a s t  a few n u c l e a r  weapons I n d i a ' s  
n u c l e a r  o b j e c t i v e s  are p r o bab l y  q u i t e  amb i t i o us  a m i s s i l e  system 
capabl e  o f  - c a c h i n g  China P a k i s t a n  ' o n l y '  seeks  a few weapons to 
det er  India In e i t h e r  case  t h e r e  are  major  i m p l i c a t i o n s  for  the way 
in which these two s t a t e s  might f i gh t  a convent i onal  war in the future 
a nucl ear  weapon w i l l  f o r c e  maj or  chances  m  s t r a t e gy  and t a c t i c s  i t  
might a l so  prov i de  the umbre l l a  under which massi ve  convent i onal  wars 
can take p l a c e — j u s t  as i t  mi ght  make the  da ng e r s  o f  e s c a l a t i o n  so 
g r ea t  that  such wars w i l l  neve r  occur  aga in And o f  g r ea t  importance 
w i l l  be the i m p l i c a t i o n s  o f  an I nd i an  or  P a k i s t a n i  nucl ear  system on 
the war p l ans  o f  the maj or  nuc l e a r  powers ( t wo  o f  which ad j o i n  the 
r eg i on )
These c a l c u l a t i o n s  o f  the i n t e r a c t i o n  between l e v e l s  o f  v i o enee 
are  not  new to the  r e g i o n  H i s t o r i c a l l y  t h e r e  has a l ways  been a
l i n k a g e  at a l ower  l e v e l  o f  v i o l e n c e  between I nd i an  and P a k i s t a n i  
capac i t y  to c on t r o l  i n s u r r e c t i o n  and o u t r i g h t  c o nven t i ona l  war the 
19^7 war over  Kashmir the 1962 Sino- Indi an war the 1965 Indo-Paki stan 
war and the 1971 war in East Pakistan a l l  began as l o w - l e v e l  c o n f l i c t s  
and esca l a t ed  when one s i de  or the other  saw that  i t  was l o s i ng  or that  
a hi gher  l e v e l  o f  v i o l e n c e  might  work to i t s  r e l a t i v e  advantage The 
ease wi th which the r e g i o n  has s l i p p e d  i n t o  l a r g e - s c a l e  war does not 
o f f e r  much reassurance for  the future
I I I ____ IMAGES OF WAR
The image o f  South A s i a  h e l d  in t he  West  i s  t h a t  o f  a poor 
overcrowded reg i on whose spat es  ar e  unne c e s s a r i l  y d i v e r t i n g  resources 
to weaponry and away from p e a c e f u l  e conomi c  p u r s u i t s  From t h i s
p e r s p e c t i v e  the l e v e l  o f  p o v e r t y  i s  so g r e a t  t n a t  i t  e x c e e ds  the
horrors  o f  war thus Indian and P a k i s t a n i  arms budgets are immoral in 
a way that  such expend i t ur es  in the West are  not Since such pover t y  
i s  s e l f - e v i d e n t  and p e r n i c i o u s  and the d i s a s t e r s  o f  war are c l e a r l y
man-made and p e r v e r s e  t he  r e g i m e s  whi ch d e v o t e  any r e s o u r c e s  to 
e x p e n d i t u r e s  beyond those  n e c e s s a r y  f o r  i n t e r n a l  o rde r  are  e i t h e r  
stupid or  d e l i n q u e n t  T h e r e f o r e  e i t h e r  a program o f  e duca t i on  or 
pr essure  or  both i s  j u s t i f i e d  on the pa r t  o f  the  l i b e r a l  West m 
dea l i ng  wi th Indians P a k i s t a n i s  and o t h e r s  who wish to purchase our 
advanced j e t  f i g h t e r s  our tanks or (most r e c e n t l y )  our nuclear fuel
Re i n f o r c i ng  the  v i ew t h a t  war i s  a l ux ur y  t h a t  the poor cannot 
a f f o r d  i s  another p e r spec t i v e  nuclear  war i s a danger that  man cannot 
r i sk  S i nce  the i n t r o d u c t i o n  o f  nu c l e a r  weapons t h i s  argumen has 
dominated the Amer i can s t r a t e g i c  l i t e r a t u r e  A l l  wars even those 
between weak r eg i ona l  powers run the  r i s k  o f  e s ca l a t i o n  Ul t i mat e l y  
th i s  means the employment o f  nu c l e a r  weapons and no r a t i ona l  purpose 
can be s e r v e d  by a n u c l e a r  e x c h a n g e   ^ L i m i t e d "  war s  may be 
p o s s i b l e  but  even c o n s e r v a t i v e  s t r a t e g i s t s  do not  a dv o c a t e  them 
l i g h t l y  When r e g i o n a l  s t a t e s  approach or  s t e p  a c r o s s  the  nucl ear  
t h r e s h o l d  then t h e  r i s k s  and c o s t s  o f  r e g i o n a l  war i n c r e a s e  in 
geomet r i ca l  progress i on Even i f  the superpowers  are not sucked into 
r e g i o n a l  n u c l e a r  c o n f l i c t s  t he  p h y s i c a l  and p o l i t i c a l  f a l l o u t  
( i nc l ud i ng  the p r o l i f e r a t i o n  o f  weapons to A f r i c a  and Lat in America 
the Middle East and South As i a)  a f f e c t s  us a l l
Whatever the degree o f  t r u t h  c o n t a i n e d  w i t h i n  these images they 
are not w i de l y  shared by fhc  s e c u r i t y  e l i t e s  o f  South Asia  ^ Wh l e 
the reg i on i s  usual l y  a s soc i a t ed  wi th ph i l o s o ph i e s  o f  non-v i o l ence  and
non-al i gnment  Indi an and P a k i s t a n i  e l i t e s  in f a c t  have a wor l d- v i ew
9s t r ong l y  shaped by war and the threat  o f  war
F i r s t  t h e r e  i s  a wi d e s p r e a d - - and no t  e n t i r e l y  i n a c c u r a t e  —  
i mp r e s s i o n  t h a t  t he  r e g i o n  l o s t  i t s  i n d e p e n d e n c e  because  o f  an 
i n a b i l i t y  to a d j u s t  t o  modern w a r f a r e  in t h e  17th Century  The 
c o l o n i a l  powers— Por tuga l  Hol land Prance and f i n a l l y  the B r i t i s h -  
b r ought  not  o n l y  s u p e r i o r  we a p o n r y  but  a l s o  s u p e r i o r  methods o f  
m i l i t a r y  o r g a n i z a t i o n  A l esson f rom t h i s  per i od i s  that  independence 
and f reedom i s  not onl y  dependent  upon a w i l l i n g n e s s  to f i gh t  but on 
the possess i on o f  the most modern m i l i t a r y  t echnol ogy
Second i ndependence  was p a r t i a l l y  a c h i e v e d  by the t h r e a t  o f  
v i o l e n c e — more p r e c i s e l y  because the B r i t i s h  were unable and unwi l l i ng  
to use f orce  to contain the wave o f  r e b e l l i o n  that  swept over India in 
19^6 The Royal  I nd i an Navy had mut i n i ed  d i s c h a r g e d  s o l d i e r s  were 
being formed i n t o  g u e r i l l a  and r obber  bands t e r r o r i s m  and sabotage 
were i nc r eas i ng  the  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  were m o b i l i z i n g  f or  d i r e c t  
ac t i on and no one was ab l e  to s t op  the  s p r e a d i n g  communal r i o t s  
Both India and P ak i s t an  were born to the accompaniment  o f  one o f  
t h i s  c e n t u r y ’ s most t e r r i b l e  mass s l a u g h t e r s  and the knowledge that  
t hey  cou l d  r e cur  i s  one  o f  t h e  unspoken  a s s u mpt i o n s  o f  r e g i o n a l  
r e l a t i o n s
Third these  communal  r i o t s  were f o l l o w e d  by a d i r e c t  s t rugg l e  
between India and Pakistan f or  c ont ro l  over Kashmir Even though t he i r  
r e s pe c t i v e  armies were commanded by B r i t i s h  g ene ra l s  (and for  a whi l e  
there was a j o i n t  B r i t i s h  command) an i n c o n c l u s i v e  war broke out 
t h i r t y - t h r e e  years l a t e r  I nd i an and P a k i s t a n i  tt oops today face each 
other  across the same c e a s e - f i r e  l i ne
Indians and Paki s tani s  see a d i r e c t  l i nka g e  between the events  o f
9s t r ong l y  shaped by war and the threat  o f  war
F i r s t  t h e r e  i s  a w i d e s p r e a d -  - a n d no t  e n t i r e l y  m a c c u r a t e - -  
ì mp r e s s i o n  t h a t  t he  r e g i o n  l o s t  i t s  i n d e p e n d e n c e  because  o f  an 
i n a b i l i t y  to a d j u s t  t o  modern w a r f a r e  in t h e  17th Century  The 
c o l o n i a l  powers— Por tuga l  Hol land France and f i n a l l y  the B r i t i s h -  
b r ought  not  o n l y  s u p e r i o r  w e a p o n r y  but  a l s o  s u p e r i o r  methods o f  
m i l i t a r y  o r g a n i z a t i o n  A l e sson f rom t h i s  per i od i s  that  independence 
and f reedom i s  not  onl y  dependent  upon a w i l l i n g n e s s  to f i g h t  but on 
the possess i on o f  the most modern m i l i t a r y  t echno l ogy
Second i ndependence  was p a r t i a l l y  a c h i e v e d  by the  t h r e a t  o f  
v i o l e n c e — more p r e c i s e l y  because the B r i t i s h  were unable and unwi l l i ng  
to use f o r ce  to contain the wave o f  r e b e l l i o n  that  swept over India m 
19^6 The Royal  I nd i an Navy had mut i n i ed  d i s c h a r g e d  s o l d i e r s  were 
being formed i n t o  g u e r i l l a  and r obbe r  bands t e r r o r i s m  and sabotage 
were i nc r eas i ng  the  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  were m o b i l i z i n g  f or  d i r e c t  
ac t i on and no one was ab l e  to s t op  the  s p r e a d i n g  communal r i o t s  
Both India and P a k i s t a n  were born to the accompaniment  o f  one o f  
t h i s  c e n t u r y ’ s most t e r r i b l e  mass s l a u g h t e r s  and the knowledge that  
t hey  c ou l d  r e c ur  i s  one  o f  t h e  unspoken a s s u mp t i o n s  o f  r e g i o n a l  
r e i a t i ons
Third these  communal  r i o t s  were f o l l o w e d  by a d i r e c t  s t r ugg l e  
between India and Pakistan f or  c on t r o l  over Kashmir Even though t he i r  
r e s pe c t i v e  armies were commanded by B r i t i s h  g ene r a l s  (and for  a whi l e  
there was a j o i n t  B r i t i s h  command) an i n c o n c l u s i v e  war broke out 
t h i r t y - t h r e e  years l a t e r  I nd i an and P a k i s t a n i  t r o o ps  today face each 
other  across the same c e a s e - f i r e  l i ne
Indians and Pak i s t an i s  see a d i r e c t  l i nk a g e  between the events  o f
19^7 and t he i r  present  p o l i t i c a l  and m i l i t a r y  s ta l emate  The 19^7 war
led to the rearmament o f  I nd i a  and Pa k i s t a n  and t h i s  in turn almost
t r i g g e r e d  a war m the 1950s a f t e r  India was plunged into a major
c o n f l i c t  wi th China in 1 962 i t  r e c e i v e d  some m i l i t a r y  grant  and sa l es
o
ass i s t ance  from the West T h i s  a i d  s h i f t e d  the balance between India 
and Pakistan and shaped p e r c e p t i o n s  and e x p e c t a t i o n s  m bouh s tat es  
l ead i ng  to a minor sk i r mi s h  and then a maj or  war in 1965 again over 
Kashmir  The way in wh i ch  jt war was f o u g h t  shaped i n t e r n a l
P a k i s t a n i  e x p e c t a t i o n s  and f a n n e d  s e c e s s i o n i s t  f e e l i n g s  in East  
Pakistan when t hese  f e e l i n g s  were e x p r e s s e d  through the b a l l o t  box 
and a c i v i l  u p r i s i n g  t hey  l ed  t o  the  e v e n t s  ( e s p e c i a l l y  the  mass 
movement o f  Hindu r e f ugees  from East  Paki s tan into I ndi a )  which caused 
India to c o n s i d e r  i t s  o p t i o n s  and then assume de f a c to  d i r e c t i o n  o f  
the Bangladesh l i b e r a t i o n  movement A f u l l - s c a l e  invas i on in the East 
l ed  d i r e c t l y  to the c r e a t i o n  o f  the  new s t a t e  o f  Bang l adesh But 
dur i ng  t h a t  war a d e c i s i o n  was t a k e n  by I n d i a  which p r epar ed  the 
ground f or  a new kind o f  e s c a l a t i o n  Concerned about I n d i a ’ s l ack o f  
p o l i t i c a l  suppor t  and the  o u t r i g h t  h o s t i l i t y  o f  P a k i s t a n ' s  powerful  
a l l i e s  I ndi ra  Gandhi a u t h o r i z e d  work on a n u c l e a r  e x p l o s i v e  dev i ce  
a p p a r e n t l y  i m m e d i a t e l y  _§_££££ the  197 1 war  Z u l f i q a r  A l l  Bhutto 
i n i t i a t e d  P a k i s t a n ' s  n u c l e a r  weapons program and the stage was set  
f o r  a nuc l e a r  arms r a c e  In b r i e f  some o f  the  most  s i g n i f i c a n t  
events m the Subcont i nent  have been w a r - r e l a t e d  and war i t s e l f  has 
nad major unant i c i pated consequences
Fourth both s t a t es  found themsel ves occupying t e r r i t o r y  which was 
deemed s t r a t e g i c  by o t h e r s  Pak i s t an  o v e r l o o k s  the  approach to the 
P e r s i a n  Gu l f  and s h a r e s  a b o r d e r  w i t h  I r a n  i t  has a l o n g  (and
di sputed)  border wi th Afghani stan and c on t r o l s  A f ghan i s t an ' s  access to 
the sea i t  i s  thus the  l e g a t e e  o f  the B r i t i s h  I nd i an Empire in i t s  
r e l a t i o n s  wi th the Russ i ans  The I nd i a ns  share  a long f r o n t i e r  wi th 
China a f r o n t i e r  whi ch i s  s t i l l  in open d i s p u t e  Even i f  these two 
new s t a t e s  had t r i e d  to i gnore  the i r  prox imi t y  to Russia and Cnina 
they were encouraged to e x p l o i t  i t  by the Western powers who were eager 
to e r e c t  b a r r i e r s  to communist expansionism
F i f t h  there  are a number o f  l a t e n t  and a c t i v e  r e g i ona l  di sputes 
which have l ed to thr ea t s  o f  f o r c e  and may yet  r e s u l t  in open war fare 
One such di spute  i s  over the d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  water resources  which are 
shared by s e ve r a l  count r i es  I nd i a  and Paki stan once ba r e l y  managed to 
ave r t  open c o n f l i c t  over t h i s  i s s ue  and more r e c e n t l y  there have been 
d i f f e r e n c e s  be tween I nd i a  Nepa l  and Bang l adesh  o v e r  the use o f  
Ganges  and B r a h ma p u t r a  w a t e r s  10 Two s i m i l a r  i s s u e s  a r e  the 
t reatment  o f  immigrant or e t hn i c  m i n o r i t i e s  ( Nepa l i s  in India Indians 
in Sr i  Lanka) and the access  t h rough one South Asian s ta t e  to another 
or to the sea ( Nepa l  t hrough I nd i a  A f g h a n i s t a n  t hrough Pak i s t an )  
There i s l i t t l e  r e g i ona l  c o o p e r a t i o n  on such mat t ers  This i s  par t l y  
because o f  the d i f f i c u l t y  o f  compromise  when r esources  are inadequate 
f or  one s t a t e  l e t  a l o ne  two but p a r t l y  because  o f  the  d i f f e r e n t  
s t r a t e g i c  p e r s p e c t i v e s  o f  I nd i a  and i t s  s ma l l e r  n e i g h b o r s  Hawkish 
Indians argue t h a t  r e g i o n a l  c o o p e r a t i o n  w i l l  come when the smal l er  
s t a t es  o f  the r eg i on acknowledge I n d i a ' s  dominance as a r e g i o n a l  g reat  
power India cou l d  then a f f o r d  to be g ene rous  in such n e g o t i a t i o n s  
Some o f  I nd i a  ' s n e i g h b o r s  r e ma i n  s k e p t i c a l  and i n s i s t  ( a s  does 
Pak i s t an)  on the r e t e n t i o n  o f  a s u b s t a n t i a l  m i l i t a r y  c a p a b i l i t y  to 
defend i n t e r e s t s  o thers  seek r e g i o n a l  arrangements so that  they ought
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to present  a more uni ted f r o n t  to t h e i r  g i a n t  nei ghbor  Should India 
grow impat i ent  wi th  the a t t e mp t s  o f  i t s  s ma l l e r  n e i g h b o r s  to asser t  
t he i r  independence i t  i s  not  i n c o n c e i v a b l e  that  i t  w i l l  use f or ce  to 
br ing  them i n t o  l i n e  as i t  used f o r c e  a g a i n s t  Hyderabad Junagadh 
Goa Kashmir and more r e c e n t l y  Sikkim
F i n a l l y  both s t a t e s  have  been c o n t i n u o u s l y  a c t i v e  wi thin the i r  
own t e r r i t o r i e s  m  s u p r e s s i n g  t r i b a l  and r e g i o n a l  r e v o l t  Some o f  
these  have been easy  to manage o t h e r s  ( such as the Naga and Mizo 
r e b e l l i o n s )  ar e  s e mi - p e r ma n e n t  in n a t u r e  They  stand as v i v i d  
r emi nde r s  t h a t  the power o f  t h e  c e n t r a l  gov e rnment s  o f  I nd i a  and 
Pakistan extend onl y as far as e f f e c t i v e  m i l i t a r y  f o r ce  can be appl i ed 
even i f  the a p p l i c a t i o n  o f  t h a t  f o r c e  g e n e r a t e s  i t s  own resentment  
among Baluchis Pathans Mizos Nagas and o thers
To summarize some o f  the e x p e r i e n c e s  and images o f  war in South 
Asia in propos i t i on form these seem to be most important
----The world i s  neo-Hobbe s i a n- - in r e g i o n a l  terms the cynica^ Kaut i l ya
s t i l l  prov i des  guidance f or  many Indians and mar t i a l  Islam for  many 
P a k i s t a n i s  no one can be t r u s t e d  u n l e s s  one has the power to 
enf or ce  an agreement
---- I ndo -Pak i s t an r e l a t i o n s  (and to a l e s s e r  d e g r e e  Indo-Bangladesh
r e l a t i o n s )  are s t i l l  a f f e c t e d  by communal and r e l i g i o u s  tension 
t h i s  means that  the very  i d e n t i t y  o f  one s t a t e  i s a cha l l enge  to the 
i d e n t i t y  o f  the other  i t  a l so  means that  the i n t e r na l  management o f  
mi nor i t y  groups (Musl ins in I nd i a  Hindus in Bangladesh Tami ls in 
Sri  Lanka) i s  not merel y a d o me s t i c  but  an i n t e r na t i ona l  problem as 
we l l
-----S e l f - r e l i a n c e  i s  v i t a l  T h i s  v i e w  came e a r l y  to I nd i a  morp
13
r e c e n t l y  to Pak i s t an  Wi t hout  i t  e x t e r n a l  arms s u p p l i e r s  w i l l  
e x p l o i t  the n a t i o n ’ s v u l n e r a b i l i t y  dur i ng  war t ime  and attempt to 
manipulate r eg i ona l  r e l a t i o n s
-For India r eg i ona l  war can b e s t  be prevented by the ex i s t ence  o f  a 
s i ng l e  dominant and t o l e r a n t  r e g i o n a l  g r ea t  power ( i t s e l f )  India 
has achi eved t h i s  dominance v i s  a v i s  Bang l adesh Nepal  and Sri  
Lanka but not Pakistan
-For Pakistan r e g i ona l  war can b e s t  be prevented by the possession 
o f  c o un t e r v a i l i n g  m i l i t a r y  power a c l ose  a s soc i a t i on  o f  the smal l er  
s t a t es  which surround I nd i a  and the s uppo r t  o f  f r i e n d l y  ext ernal  
power s
-The borders  o r South Asia are long permeable to p ro t ec t  and hi gnl y  
susc ep t i b l e  to pene t ra t i on from the out s i de  Subversion o f  r e s t l e s s  
domest i c t r i b e s  and e thni c  mi n o r i t i e s  by ou t s i de r s  i s  expected 
-Both India and P ak i s t an  b e l i e v e  t ha t  t hey  f a c e  m u l t i p l e  m i l u a r v  
threa t s  India from China and Pakistan Pakistan from India and the 
Sov i e t  Union they  ar e  thus p a r t i c u l a r l y  r e s i s t e n t  to suggest i ons 
that  they s e t t l e  t h e i r  own b i - l a t e r a l  d i sputes  since such di sputes  
have long s ince become entang l ed  wi th broader  S i no - Sov i e t  and U S - 
Sov i e t  c o n f l i c t s
-Despi t e  the presumed ma n a g e a b i l i t y  o f  war i t  can have profound and 
unexpected domest i c p o l i t i c a l  consequences 
-Nucl ear  weapons are most l i k e l y  to be used when one s t a t e  possesses 
them and ano t he r  does  not  the  o n l y  h i s t o r i c a l  example o f  t he i r  
actual  use in wart ime i s " p roo f '  o f  t h i s  a s s e r t i on
IV____ MILITARISM___THE MILITARY__AND POLITICS
I t  i s  w i d e l y  t h o u g h t  t h a t  war  i s  an e f f e c t i v e  means o f
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c e n t r a l i z i n g  s tat e  power yet  some ev i dence  suggests  that  war i s f eared 
by r u l i n g  e l i t e s  as t h r e a t e n i n g  to t h e i r  power The e x p e r i e n c e  o f  
South Asia supports both arguments  p r e p a r a t i o n  f or  war m i l i t a n c y ’ 
in Stani s l aw Andresk i ' s  terms i s  a d e v i c e  used by e l i t e s  o f  India and 
P a k i s t a n  to  enhanc e  t h e i r  own p o w e r  and t h a t  o f  t he  c e n t r a l  
governments Yet these e l i t e s  are aware that  actual  war fare  can lead 
to unpred i c t ab l e  r e s u l t s  and that  a f t e r  every  major c o n f l i c t  the power 
o f  c en t r a l  l eade rs  has s u f f e r ed  Th i s  i s  most obv i ous l y  true a f t e r
m i l i t a r y  de f e a t  ( I nd i a  in 1962 Pakistan in 1971) but i t  i s  a l so true 
to some degree  a f t e r  m i l i t a r y  s t a l e m a t e  ( A y u b ' s  d e c l i n e  began a f t e r  
Pakistan f ought  to a draw in 1 965 when v i c t o r y  was e x pec t ed )  Even 
v i c t o r y  proved c o s t l y  to I n d i r a  Gandhi  a f t e r  1971 she managed to 
c o n s o l i d a t e  her own power but the c o s t  o f  the  war a f f e c t e d  Indian 
economic growth and the e up h o r i a  g e n e r a t e d  by the de f e a t  o f  Pakistan 
may have r a i sed  popular e xpec t a t i ons  to unf u l f i 11abl e  l e v e l s  In the 
long run s e cu r i t y  e l i t e s  o f  both s t a t e s  would seem to f ind a s t at e  o f  
no-war  no - pe a c e  to be an opt i mum s i t u a t i o n  I t  a l l o w s  them to 
i n t e r n a t i o n a l i z e  domest i c problems (such as the t reatment  o f  r e l i g i o u s  
or ethni c  m i n o r i t i e s )  and domest i cate  i n t e r na t i o n a l  problems ( the 
s tatus o f  Kashmir the suppor t  o f  i n s u r g e n t s  by ex t e rna l  powers)  a 
degree o f  i n t e r na t i ona l  t ens i on j u s t i f i e s  the cont inued bui ld-up o f  
state-owned defense product i on f a c i l i t i e s  work on nucl ear  exp l os i v e s  
and an e vas i v e  a t t i t ude  toward r eg i ona l  de t ent e  a degree o f  domest i c 
t ens i on j u s t i f i e s  the maintenance o f  p r e v en t i v e  de t ent i on laws or 
mar t i a l  law censorship o f  the press and an e l abora t e  domest ic 
i n t e l l i g e n c e  ne twork i t  i s  hard t o  g o v e r n  I n d i a  Pak i s t an  and 
Bangladesh in the bes t  o f  t i mes  even wi t hou t  the advant age  o f  such
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arrangements
Whi l e the p o l i t i c s  o f  I nd i a  Pak i s t an  and Bang l adesh are a l l  
c h a r a c t e r i z e d  by t h i s  c i v i l i a n  m i l i t a r i s m  t h e r e  ar e  i mpor t ant  
d i f f e r e n c e s  between I ndi a  on the  one hand and Paki stan and Bangladesh 
on the other  in the degree  and e f f e c t i v e n e s s  o f  ac tua l  c i v i l i a n  cont ro l  
over the m i l i t a r y
India i s  the surpr i se  o f  the Third World in that  i t s  army has not 
played a s i g n i f i c a n t  r o l e  in p o l i t i c s  This has not prevented outs ide  
obse r ve r s  from p r e d i c t i n g  the imminent  i n t e r v e n t i o n  o f  the genera l s  
f o l l o w i ng  the example s e t  by Pak i s t an  and even Bangladesh The most 
s u p e r f i c i a l  examinat ion o f  t hese  c o u n t r i e s  i n d i c a t e s  why the m i l i t a r y  
have no t  i n t e r v e n e d  in I n d i a  a l t h o u g h  i t  a l s o  p o i n t s  to some 
weaknesses  in the  s y s t e m F i r s t  and f o r e m o s t  I n d i a n  c i v i l i a n  
p o l i t i c i a n s  and c i v i l  s e r v a n t s  r e t a i n e d  a compl ex  admi n i s t r a t i v e  and 
f i s c a l  c o n t r o l  system i n s t i t u t e d  by the B r i t i s h  in the e a r l y  20th 
Century  Second l y  and o f  u t mo s t  i m p o r t a n c e  I nd i an  p o l i t i c i a n s  
managed the i r  a f f a i r s  in such a way as to p r o v i d e  at l e a s t  reasonably  
e f f e c t i v e  government and accept ed a good por t i on o f  the blame for  the 
m i l i t a r y  de f ea t  o f  1962 In P ak i s t an  the m i l i t a r y  were l ess  competent 
but more important for  the s u r v i v a l  o f  the s t a t e  and as they began to 
i n t e r f e r e  m p o l i t i c s  as e a r l y  as 1 953 t h i s  pr ae to r i a n i sm provided 
both an excuse and a way out f o r  the  p o l i t i c a l  community to escape i t s  
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y  to govern Only Bhut to saw the problem c l e a r l y  but he 
lacked the p e r s o n a l  q u a l i t i e s  which would e na b l e  him b o t h t o  govern 
e f f e c t i v e l y  and pac i f y  the m i l i t a r y  A s i m i l a r  s i t ua t i o n  occurred m 
Bangladesh when i t  became c l e a r  t ha t  Muj ibur  Rahman was not equal  
to what may have been an imposs i bl e  task
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There i s  c o n s i d e r a b l e  s e l f - s a t i s f a c t i o n  among I nd i ans  at t he i r  
near l y  unique achievement  and t hey  tend to assume that  t h e i r  genera l s  
w i l l  never s tage  a coup In f a c t  t h e r e  has been a slow acc r e t i on  o f  
power by the m i l i t a r y  pa r t l y  because c i v i l i a n s  are ext r eme l y  a t t e n t i v e  
t o  t h e i r  r e q u e s t s  f o r  modern weapons but a l s o  because  the I ndi an 
p o l i t i c a l  system has entered a per i od o f  enormous unce r t a i n t y  Defense 
has become a p o l i t i c a l l y  important  mi n i s t r y  because o f  the patronage i t  
commands and because o f  i t s  a s s o c i a t i o n  wi th the m i l i t a r y  i t  was used 
subt l y  by s e v e r a l  d e f e n s e  m i n i s t e r s  to enhance t h e i r  own power and 
qui t e  crude l y  f or  the same purpose  by Bansi  Lai  I t  i s  poss i b l e  that  
should no c l ea r  l e ade r s h i p  emerge  f rom the present  p o l i t i c a l  d i sorder  
m India that  the m i l i t a r y  w i l l  be c o n s u l t e d  by one p o l i t i c a l  f ac t i on  
or another ( or  by Mrs Gandhi h e r s e l f )  there  was some i nd i ca t i on  ohat 
t h i s  occurred dur ing the Emergency and i f  the process  cont inued over a 
per i od o f  years the end o f  the decade  could f i nd  the Indian m i l i t a r y  
conf ronted wi th the same di l emma f aced  by the Pakistan and Bangladesn 
armies in r ecent  y e a r s   ^ I f  the chaos o f  p o l i t i c s  begins to a f f e c t  
p r e p a r e d n e s s  o f  t h e  c o u n t r y  d o e s  t h e  m i l i t a r y  i t s e l f  have an 
o b l i g a t i o n  to i t s e l f  and to the s t a t e  to suppor t  t hose  g roups ( o r  
i nt ervene  i t s e l f )  to r e s t o r e  o r de r  and s t a b i l i t y 9 I doubt that  t h i s  
w i l l  occur soon but cont inued p o l i t i c a l  d i sorde r  a renewal  o f  
c o n f l i c t  wi th one or more ne i ghbo r s  and the nu c l e a r i z a t i o n  o f  the 
reg i on could change the cont ext  m  which c i v i l i a n  c on t r o l  i s pr esent l y  
exe r c i sed  and prove the pess imi s t s  c o r r e c t
V ALTERNATI V E STRATEGIC FUTURES 
When Dick Park and I wro t e  about  I nd i a  s emergence as a r eg i ona l
dominant power we were engaged in a t ask  o f  persuasion rather  than one
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o f  p r e d i c t i o n  Indeed even the Nixon A d m i n i s t r a t i o n  had admi t ted
I n d i a ' s  dominant  r e g i o n a l  s t a t u s  by 1972 we were b e l a b o r i n g  the
obvious al though t h e r e  are  s t i l l  some who r e f u s e  to acknowledge the
12r e a l i t i e s  o f  the s i t u a t i o n
What we were not s e n s i t i v e  to were the pos s i b l e  v a r i a t i o n s  impl i ed 
in the r e g  io n a l - dom in ant  p o s i t i o n  and the i n f l u e n c e  t h a t  o u t s i d e  
powers might have on r e g i ona l  balances ( or  more proper l y  imbalances)  
We did suggest  the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  Pak i s t an  de v e l o p i ng  c l ose  t i e s  with 
the Sov i e t  Union This was s e emi ng l y  an o u t l a nd i s h  idea but in f act  
one  q u i t e  p o p u l a r  in P a k i s t a n  e v en  t o d a y  and even among the 
n o t - s o - p - o - Amer i ^an Pak i s t an  m i l i t a r y
P r e d i c t i o n s  about  the  f u t u r e  a r e  r i s k y  but t h e r e  w i l l  be a 
future  T S E l i o t  made the point  when he wrote that  "We cannot think 
o f  a future  that  i s  not l i a b l e  l i k e  the past to have no des t i na t i on  " 
and he muses ( a l ong  wi th Kr i shna  —  most a p p r o p r i a t e l y  f o r  t h i s  essay)  
that  the future  remains " p r e s s e d  be tween y e l l o w  l e av e s  o f  a book that  
has never  been opened " Wi thout  presuming to open the book i t  i s 
poss i b l e  to suggest  t he  range  o f  l i k e l y  f u t u r e s  in f i v e  or ten years 
from now What w i l l  the r e g i o n a l  s t r u c t u r e  o f  South As i a  be then9 
Wi l l  we l ook back to 1 982 or 1 983 ( as  we might l ook back to 1 963-U or 
1968-9 two c r i t i c a l  years )  and say t h a t  i f  on l y  t h i s  or that  had been 
done then the reg i on would be qui t e  d i f f e r e n t - ’
Exc l ud i ng  the i mpr obab l e  t he  u n l i k e l y  o r  the u n p r e d i c t a b l e  
( nucl ear  war unprecedented mass f amine d e s t r u c t i v e  p o l i t i c a l  chaos)  
but assuming a cont inued So v i e t  p r e s e nc e  m Afghani stan dependence on 
Middle Eastern o i l  and new a c c r e t i o n s  o f  nuc l ear  t echnol ogy  what i s  
the range o f  the  n e a r - t e r m f u t u r e 9 I see  f our  a l t e r n a t i v e  r eg i ona l
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s e cur i t y  s t ruc tur es
1) I ndi a vs Pakistan
E s s e n t i a l l y  a c o n t i n u a t i o n  o f  t h i r t y - f o u r  y e a r s  o f  h o s t i l i t y  
between India and Pak i s t an  wi t h  each s e e k i n g  and o b t a i n i n g  support 
from one or more o u t s i d e  powers The a l i g n me n t  might  remain India + 
U S S R  vs Pak i s t an  + PRC and U S A  The r i v a l r y  between the two 
subcont inenta l  powers i s  l i k e l y  to be n u c l e a n z e d  perhaps extended to 
the Gu l f  ( wher e  each w i l l  have to harmoni ze  i t s  i n t e r e s t s  wi th i t s  
superpower patron)  and above a l l  remain unstabl e  Both sides w i l l  be 
prepared f or  c o n v e n t i o n a l  war have  adopt ed a f i r s t - s t r i k e  doc t r i ne  
and w i l l  be t r y i n g  to f i g u r e  out  how to u t i l i z e  n u c l e a r  weapons for  
t a c t i c a l  as we l l  as s t r a t e g i c  purposes This i s  a r e g i ona l  system with 
a high degree o f  i n s t a b i l i t y
2) India vs Pakistan managed by U S S R
T h i s  s y s t e m  i s  l i k e l y  o n l y  i f  t h e r e  i s  a m a j o r  c h a n g e  o f  
gove rnment  in Pak i s t an  The S o v i e t  Uni on may then emerge as the 
" ba l ancer "  o f  South Asia inducing and thr ea t en i ng  both r eg i ona l  powers 
into c o o pe r a t i o n  C o n c e i v a b l y  the S o v i e t  Union might  f ind a f u l l y  
c oope r a t i v e  Pakistan amenable to " F i n l a n d i z a t i o n "  now openl y  advocated 
by some P a k i s t a n i  i n t e l l e c t u a l s  and abandon i t s  suppo r t  f o r  I nd i a  
a l t o ge t he r  m f avor  o f  the s t r a t e g i c a l l y  e qua l l y  use ful  Pakistan
3) Indian dominat ion
An exasperated India concerned about a compet ing r i v a l  suppl i ed by 
out s i de  powers and on the verge  o f  nu c l e a r i z a t i o n  may s i mp l i f y  r eg i ona l  
r e l a t i o n s  by e l i mi na t i ng  Pakistan as a m i l i t a r y  power A r e - v i v i  sec ted 
Pakistan ( wi th an independent but d i sarmed West Punjab)  would not t i l t  
the balance o f  I nd i an domes t i c  p o l i t i c s  and would o n l y  t emporar i l y
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comp l i ca t e  I n d i a ' s  r e l a t i o n s  wi th  the Gu l f  S t a t e s  but i t  would put 
I nd i an and S o v i e t  t r o o p s  a c r o s s  t he  bo r de r  ( t h e  I n d u s 9) f rom each 
other  unless Indi a was w i l l i n g  to c o n t i nue  i t s  ba l anc i ng  r o l e  v i s  a 
v i s  China i t  would not f i nd  the  S o v i e t s  generous  in the d i s t r i b u t i o n  
o f  spheres o f  i n f l uence  and a v a r i a t i o n  o f  02 might emerge
4)  India as r e g i ona l  l eader  by consensus
A syst em m which I n d i a n  e c o n o m i c  and m i l i t a r y  dominance i s  
appa r en t  and a c c e p t ed  but  o t h e r  r e g i o n a l  s t a t e s  are a l l o we d  the 
p o s s i b u t y  o f  o p t i n g  out by expand i ng  t h e i r  t i e s  wi th each other  and 
(most i mpo r t a n t l y )  e x t e r n a l  powers Nuc l ea r  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  may have 
occurred but by n e g o t i a t i o n  and agreement  between India and Pakistan 
( a s  to  l e v e l s  t a r g e t s  command and c o n t r o l  p r o c e d u r e s  e t c  ) 
mechanisms e x i s t  to e s t ab l i sh  r eg i ona l  consensus on the f l ow o f  weapons 
i n t o  t he  r e g i o n  the  d e v e l o p m e n t  o f  n u c l e a r  weapons the  r o l e  o f  
r e g i ona l  s t a t e s  in the G u l f  and the p r e s e nc e  o f  superpowers  in the 
r eg i on  India i s  pr imus i n t e r p a r e s but a l l  s t a t e s  have veto power 
that  can be enforced by t he i r  wi thdrawal  
G e t t i n g  f rom He r e  t o  I h e r e
In an o p t i m i s t i c  f rame o f  mind I woul d  a t t a c h  the f o l l o w i n g  
p r o b a b i l i t i e s  to these four s c e n a r i o s  0 1 cont i nua t i on  o f  the status 
quo (or  worse)  40% 02 South As i a  as a Sov i e t  sphere o f  i n f l uence
15% 03 Indian dominat ion 15% //4 r e g i o n a l  consensus 30% In my
pess i mi s t i c  moments I r ev e r se  the  i nner  and outer  percentages  I vi ew 
0 4 as the best  p o s s i b l e  r e g i o n a l  s e c u r i t y  a r rangement  Al though i t s  
i mper f ec t i ons  and r i s k s  would f i l l  a book i t  i s  c ons i s t en t  wi th the 
charac t er  and needs o f  r e g i o n a l  s t a t e s  How do we g e t  from here to
t h e r e 9 The f o l l o w i ng  are s p e c i f i c  s t eps  which are use ful  m t h e i r  own
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r i gh t  and which buf f e r  or reduce i n f l ammat ory  pe r c ep t i ons  in the minds 
o f  superpower e l i t e s  as we l l  as r e g i ona l  l eaders
A Pursue a se t t l ement  o f  t e r r i t o r i a l  d i sput es  r e co gn i z i ng  that 
whether i n t r a - r e g  ion al  or between r eg i ona l  s t a t e s  and an out s i de  power 
s e c u r i t y  as w e l l  as s ymbo l i c  i n t e r e s t s  ar e  at  s t ake  Some o f  these 
d i sput es  (1 e Kashmir)  cannot  be " s e t t l e d "  wi thout  an ex t r aord i nary  
amount o f  ob f usca t i on  and w i l l  t ake t i me  and a s t ep - by - s t ep  approach 
Others such as India-China may be amenable to more sensat i ona l  swaps 
o f  t e r r i t o r y  as Krishna Menon o r i g i n a l l y  proposed
B As Pj ì £t  o f  t h e s e  s e t t l e m e n t s  r e d u c e  o r  r e d e p l o y  armed
f o r ces  ho pe f u l l y  as pa r t  o f  a g r o s s  r e d u c t i o n  o f  arms Indians say 
that  they w i l l  not wai t  f o r  d P a k i s t a n i  a t t a c k  be f o r e  s t r i k i n g  in " the 
next  war " Pak i s t ani s  say the same t h i n g  adding that  t h e i r  geography 
makes i t  necessary f o r  them to mount an " o f f e n s i v e - d e f e n s i v e "  This i s  
a formula f or  d i s a s t e r  p a r t i c u l a r l y  i f  nucl ear  weapons enter  into the 
a r sena l s  o f  both s t a t e s  I w i l l  exp l or e  th i s  m d e t a i l  below
C Pur sue  l o n g - t e r m  e c o n o m i c  p r o j e c t s  wh i c h  a r e  mut ua l l y
ent ang l i ng  and which c r e a t e  c o s t s  f o r  both s i d e s  i f  e i t h e r  dec ides  to 
pu l l  out  Such p r o j e c t s  mi ght  i n c l u d e  j o i n t  v e n t u r e s  in the Gul f  
shar ing  o f  r i v e r  wat er  the c o - p r o d u c t i on o f  e l e c t r i c i t y  ( i n nuclear 
f a c i l i t i e s  as David L i l i e n t h a l  was arguing j us t  be f o r e  hi s  death)  and 
even weapons coproduct i on or shar ing
D D e v e l o p  a r e g  i  o n - s pe c  i  f i c d o c t r i n e  s u p p l e m e n t i n g  
non-al i gnment  whi ch p r o t e c t s  the i n t e r e s t s  o f  the sma l l e r  r eg i ona l  
s t a t es  w h i l e  c o n c e d i n g  to the  l a r g e s t  i t s  dominant  s t a t u s  Such a 
doc t r i ne  might prov i de  g u i d e l i n e s  f o r  r e g i o n a l  summits mechanisms for  
j o i n t  responses to events  e l sewhere ( p a r t i c u l a r l y  when the i n t e r e s t s  o f
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one or  more r e g i o n a l  s t a t e s  a r e  at  s t a k e )  and which s e t  down the 
c o n d i t i o n s  f o r  the  economic  p o l i t i c a l  or  m i l i t a r y  p r e s ence  o f  a 
superpower in the reg i on 
Some S p e c i f i c  Pr ob l ems
The most l i k e l y  f u t ur e  (//1 ) may occur  because  no important power
i s  vpry unhappy wi th i t — or at l e as t  every  important  power can veto any
change by thr ea t en i ng  to br ing about something worse
In the case o f  the superpowers  the S o v i e t  Union probably f avors
the p r e s e n t  i mba l anced b a l ance  between I nd i a  and P ak i s t an  and w i l l
manipulate i t  f or  i t s  own ends They may not wish to make Pakistan an
a l l y  or  even become the a r b i t e r  o f  a t he  r e g i o n  which i s  o f mi xed
1 4or  marg in i n t e r e s t  to the S o v i e t s  T h i s  would change to the
degree that  t h e y  come to v i ew Pak i s t an  as a Southwest  Asian or Gul f  
power The U S does  not  l o s e  f rom the p r e s e n t  a r rangement  but i t  
would gain f rom a r e g i o n a l  accord  ( e v en  i f  i t  was exc l uded from the 
r eg i on )  So the supe rpower s  p r e s e n t  ob s t a c 1e s - - b u t  not i nsuperabl e  
ones— to movement towards Scenar i o //M
The s ma l l e r  r e g i o n a l  p o we r s  i n c l u d i n g  P a k i s t a n  ga i n  t h e i r  
l e v e r age  through c o n f l i c t s  between India and other  s t a t e s  The current  
I n d i a - C h i n a  bo r de r  n e g o t i a t i o n s  w i l l  t h r e a t e n  such s t a t e s  unl ess  
assurances o f  the p r e s e r v a t i o n  o f  l e g i t i m a t e  ex t e rna l  t i e s  ( i nc l ud i ng  
m i l i t a r y  ones)  are par t  o f  an arrangement
For s l i g h t l y  d i f f e r e n t  r e a s o n s  t h e r e  a r e  many g r oups  and 
i n s t i t u t i o n s  in I nd i a  t ha t  oppose  r e g i o n a l  r e c o n c i l i a t i o n  i f  i t  does 
not mean absolute  Indian dominance Not onl y  do s p e c i f i c  groups favor 
the present  arrangement f or  i d e o l o g i c a l  reasons but i-heir car eer s  are
l i nked to the Indian mi l i t a r y - i n d us t r i  al complex This has served as a
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use ful  s a f e t y - v a l v e  f o r  dome s t i c  p o l i t i c a l  purposes  but reduct i on in 
arms l e v e l s  in India (and in Pakistan as in 1951 and 1977) would r a i s e  
domest i c p o l i t i c a l  problems
There are t e chn i ca l  m i l i t a r y  and arms cont r o l  problems assoc i at ed 
wi th Scenar io #4 The rapid i n t r oduc t i on  o f  p r e c i s i on - gu i ded  muni t ions 
(PGMs) m the reg i on i s  part  o f  a broad t e chn i ca l  m i l i t a r y  r evo l u t i on  
the d i f f i c u l t  thing about such r e v o l u t i o n s  i s  that  i t  i s  not  poss i b l e  
to p r e d i c t  how t hey  w i l l  t u r n  o u t  and whether  PGMs and o t he r  new 
weapons may not make i t  more d i f f i c u l t  to achi eve  a r educt i on m arms 
a pul l - back  o f  f o r ces  e t c  Both I nd i a  and Paki stan have ' t w o - f r o n t ” 
war s i t ua t i ons  but t hey  a r e  a s y m m e t r i c a l l y  v u l n e r a b l e  to ai r  at tack 
and have d i f f e r e n t  k i nds  o f  v u l n e r a b i l i t y  "on the  ground ' I nd i a ' s  
Jaguars have pushed the P a k i s t a n  A i r  Fo r ce  to wi thin s i x t y  seconds o f  
Af ghan bases  and both c o u n t r i e s  have h i g h - v a l u e  t a r g e t s  open to 
a t t ack from the o t he r  s i d e  ( n u c l e a r  f a c i l i t i e s  i r r i g a t i o n  and hydel  
works as w e l l  as p o p u l a t i o n  c e n t e r s )  Wars m  the  r e g i o n  have 
ne c e s s a r i l y  been l i mi t ed  and i t  o n l y  r ema i ns  to s pe c i f y  t he i r  future 
parameters t a l k  about " r e g r e t t i n g  the  nex t  war" i s  not very  he l p ful  
and f eeds f i r s t - s t r i k e  f anat i c i sm in both count r i es
To summarize the nucl ear  p r o l i f e r a t i o n  i ssue i t  needs onl y  to be 
pointed out that  c o o r d i n a t i o n  o f  r e g i o n a l  nuc l ear  programs w i l l  y i e l d  
f ar  more i n f l u e n c e  on supe rpower s  and o i l  s t a t e s  than c ompe t i t i on  
which i s  used by o u t s i d e r s  f o r  t h e i r  own purposes  I f  I nd i a  and 
Pakistan can agree on l e v e l s  or p l a t e a u s  no f i r s t - s t r i k e  de c l a r a t i ons  
and some command and cont ro l  procedures then ou t s i de r s  need only 
r a t i f y  the arrangement— as l ong as i t  docs not promote p r o l i f e r a t i o n
into more unstable r eg i ons
South A s i 3 * s movement f rom S c e n a r i o  //1 to somethi ng  e l s e  has 
a l ready begun The S o v i e t  i n v a s i o n  and the c o m p e t i t i o n  f or  o i l  and 
energy has ensured that  nucl ear  e ne r g y  and nuclear  weapons w i l l  remain 
l inked Since 1972 Indian genera l s  have been i n c r e a s i ng l y  unwi l l i ng  to 
adopt a pa t i ent  or t o l e r a n t  a t t i t u d e  towards Pakistan and th i s  in turn 
goads Pakistan to search for  a weapon t ha t  w i l l  f o r e v e r  r ep l ace  f i c k l e  
f r i e n ds  In s ho r t  t h e r e  i s  good cause f o r  war in South As i a  and 
reason t o be l i e v e  t h a t  i t  would " n o r m a l i z e ” r e l a t i o n s  between T nd i a 
and i t s  ne i ghbors  once and for  a l l  Yet  desp i t e  the temptat i on the 
cos t s  o f  changing the r eg i ona l  s t ruc tur e  by f o r ce  are enormous My 
es t imat i on i s  t h a t  more p e o p l e  w i l l  d i e  in a war in which onl y  dams 
were at tacked than one in which c i t i e s  were t a r g e t s  Scenar i o i s 
worth cons i de r i ng  and India i s  the key f a c t o r
India must debate the quest i on whether or not i t  wants permanently 
h o s t i l e  ne i ghbors  or whether  i t  wi shes  to r each a peace ful  se t t l ement  
wi th them Does i t  s u b s c r i b e  to K a u t i l y a ' s  im<jge o f  the  wor ld or 
Nehru' s9 Are S o v i e t  weapons more i mpo r t a n t  than good r e l a t i o n s  wi th 
the ne i ghbors against  whom those  weapons w i l l  be used9 My own answer 
would be no weapons can be a c q u i r e d  e l sewhere  but I n d i a ’ s nei ghbors 
w i l l  s t a y  in the  r e g i o n  f o r e v e r  Wi t hout  an I nd i an  w i l l i n g n e s s  to 
debate and move on t h i s  i s s ue  o t h e r  s t a t e s  can do v e r y  l i t t l e  —  but 
they can do something
The U S  m  p a r t i c u l a r  can p l a y  a c o n s t r u c t i v e  t w o f o l d  r o l e  
F i r s t  i t  can encourage  China to g r an t  t hos e  t e r r i t o r i a l  concessi ons 
which w i l l  s a t i s f y  Indian s e c u r i t y  i n t e r e s t s  wi thout  harming i t s  own 
Second i t  can l i n k  Amer i can arms t r a n s f e r s  to r e g i o n a l  s t a t e s  to 
c r i t e r i a  j o i n t l y  e s t a b l i s h e d  by I nd i a  and P a k i s t a n  The same (but
2M
broadened to i n c l u d e  o t he r  r e g i o n a l  s t a t e s )  a p p l i e s  to r e g i o n a l  
economic pr o j e c t s  Thi rd l y  i t  can cont inue i t s  pressure on the Sov i e t  
Union to wi thdraw from Af ghani s tan but not i gnore  the p o s s i b i l i t y  o f  
a p o l i t i c a l  se t t l ement  Any a t t empt  to bleed the So v i e t s  i n d e f i n i t e l y  
may be g r a t i f y i n g  but i t  w i l l  h a r d l y  t ake  much pressure  o f f  o f  NATO 
or China
In the end the  two maj or  r e g i o n a l  powers  P a k i s t a n  and India 
w i l l  l a r g e l y  shape r e g i ona l  d e ve l o pment s  Paki stan i s  the state  with 
most to gain and most to l o s e  No P a k i s t a n i  l eader  can e a s i l y  enter
into  a r eg i ona l  accord wi th I nd i a  w i t h o u t  i r o n c l a d  guarantees that  i t  
w i l l  n o t  a g a i n  be  s u b j e c t e d  t o  p r e s s u r e  a t t a c k  o r  e v e n  
dismemberment The Pa k i s t a n i  n u c l e a r  program i s  not m i t s e l f  such a 
guarantee nor can American or Chinese  assurances be r e l i e d  upon in a 
major c r i s i s  The o n l y  g ua r an t e e  t h a t  c oun t s  i s  one g i v e n  by tne 
Indians but that  in turn p l aces  Pak i s t an  at the mercy o f  the s h i f t i n g  
balance o f  power wi thin I nd i a  But Pak i s t an  i s  not wi thout  resources 
in a f f e c t i n g  t h a t  b a l a n c e  o f  power  i t  can ag r e e  to compromise on 
t e r r i t o r i a l  i s s u e s  and i t  can p r o v i d e  a s s u r a n c e s  in ma t t e r s  o f  
communal harmony r e l a t i o n s  wi t h  the I s l a m i c  wor l d  and induct i on o f  
weapons into the reg i on
India as the r e g i o n ’ s dominant s t at e  has been urged by nei ghbors 
and f r i e n d l y  o u t s i d e r s  to ac t  in a magnanimous f ash i on Yet t h i s  i s  
p o l i t i c a l l y  unpopular in India and many Indian e l i t e s  s t i l l  see the i r  
own country as weak f r a g i l e  and v u l n e r a b l e  They pr e f e r  to react  
not to under take new i n i t i a t i v e s  and t hey  remain susp i c i ous  o f  the 
e f f o r t s  o f  o t h e r  r e g i o n a l  s t a t e s  t o  d e v e l o p  p r o t e c t i v e  t i e s  wi t h 
o u t s i d e  powers I t  may take  a no t he r  shock as g r e a t  as the S o v i e t
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invas i on 
which i s
o f  Afghani stan to prompt I nd i a  to assume the l eade rsh i p  r o l e  
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